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SIGNALING  GAMES  AND  STABLE  EQUILIBRIA* 
IN-KOo CHO  AND DAVID M.  KREPS 
Games  in  which  one  party  conveys  private  information  to  a second  through 
messages  typically  admit large numbers of sequential  equilibria, as the second party 
may  entertain  a wealth  of beliefs  in response  to  out-of-equilibrium  messages.  By 
restricting  those  out-of-equilibrium  beliefs,  one  can  sometimes  eliminate  many 
unintuitive  equilibria.  We  present  a  number  of  formal  restrictions  of  this  sort, 
investigate  their  behavior  in  specific  examples,  and  relate  these  restrictions  to 
Kohlberg and Mertens' notion  of stability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of  information economics has  been  concerned with 
situations  in which the  following  simple signaling  game  is embed- 
ded: one party, hereafter called party A, possesses private informa- 
tion. On the basis of this information,  A sends a signal to a second 
party  B,  who  thereupon  takes  an  action.  Examples  abound: 
Spence's [1974] model of job market signaling  is one example, if we 
modify things slightly so there are two or more parties B. (We shall 
develop a simple case of the Spence model in this format in Section 
V.) Grossman [1981] examines the role of warranties  and product 
quality using this sort of model. Models of bargaining  with incom- 
plete information  (see, for example, Grossman  and Perry [1986a]  or 
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Rubinstein [1985]) constitute another class of examples. In the 
literature of industrial organization,  there is the entry-deterrence 
limit pricing  model of Milgrom  and Roberts [1982a],  the analyses of 
the chain-store  game of Kreps and Wilson [1982b]  and Milgrom  and 
Roberts [1982b], and recent work on the role of advertising by 
Milgrom  and Roberts [1986].  Theoretical  accountants  often employ 
this  sort  of  model  (see, for example, Demski  and  Sappington 
[1986]).  And, on a slightly higher  plane, there is the general  analysis 
of a game of this sort due to Crawford  and Sobel [1982],  and related 
work on mechanism design by an informed principal [Myerson, 
1983].  This is only a partial  list (and apologies  are tendered to those 
left off), and in most cases the models are variations on the general 
theme outlined above. But this theme, together with variations,  has 
been played a lot recently. 
In most of these recitals,  one finds a plethora  of equilibria.  This 
paper takes a noncooperative game-theoretic approach, and we 
mean here a plethora of Nash equilibria. One can cut back on the 
number of equilibria  by invoking notions of perfection (or sequen- 
tiality), but this is only of minor  help-in  many games the wealth of 
off-the-equilibrium  path beliefs that can be imposed gives rise to a 
wealth of equilibria. That is, what constitutes an equilibrium is 
powerfully  affected by the "interpretations"  that would be given by 
B to messages that A might have sent, but in equilibrium  does not 
send. In a sequential equilibrium, B is required to frame some 
hypothesis (probability  assessment) over what is A's private infor- 
mation and respond accordingly.  As one varies those hypotheses, 
one varies the optimal responses  of B, and hence the incentives of A 
to send the various  messages. 
At this point, in many of these contextually  based analyses,  the 
analyst(s) resorts to various intuitive criteria based on the conclu- 
sions  that  B  "ought" to  draw from sundry out-of-equilibrium 
messages. If  one can restrict the  out-of-equilibrium beliefs  (or 
hypotheses) of B, one can sometimes eliminate many of the equilib- 
ria. An example  of this that is particularly  prevalent  runs as follows: 
suppose, for simplicity, that A 's private information  must be one of 
two things, called t and t'. Suppose that in equilibrium A sends 
message m with probability one. Suppose that there is a second 
possible message  m' with the following  properties:  if A knows  t, then 
A would strictly prefer (in comparison with the equilibrium out- 
come) not to send m', no matter how B interprets this. And if A 
knows  t',  then  A  would  prefer  to  send  m' to  what  A  gets  in  the 
equilibrium  if by sending  m'  A could  convince  B  that  A knew  t'. SIGNALING  GAMES  AND STABLE  EQUILIBRIA  181 
The  former condition, it  is  argued, implies that  B  should not 
entertain the hypothesis that the message did come from an A who 
knows t. B should infer from the message that A knows t'. And, 
therefore,  if A knows t', he should send the message (thus upsetting 
the given equilibrium).  It is as if A, if he knows t', is (by sending m') 
implicitly making  the speech: 
I am sending  the message  m', which ought  to convince  you that I know  t'. For I 
would never wish to send m' if I know t, while if I know t', and if sending  this 
message  so convinces  you, then, as you can see, it is in my interest to send it. 
This  particular criterion, and minor extensions to  it,  have 
appeared  in several  of the applications  described  above. It has been 
applied directly in Grossman  [1981],  Milgrom  and Roberts [1982a], 
and Kreps and Wilson [1982b], and it  is  applied indirectly in 
Rubinstein [1985]. Its powers  can be considerable:  in a simple (two 
type) Spence signaling  model, there is a single equilibrium  outcome 
that survives  this criterion  (see Section V). 
While analyses of particular examples have been based on 
intuitive criteria  for out-of-equilibrium  beliefs such as the one just 
given, there have been, at the same time, further attempts to refine 
generally the notion of a Nash equilibrium. An important recent 
example of this is the Kohlberg-Mertens  [1986] theory of stability 
and stable  equilibrium  outcomes. 
Because the Kohlberg-Mertens  development takes place in a 
very abstract context, it is hard to see what stability entails for 
concrete examples. One point of this paper is to see what stability 
does entail for (generic)  signaling  games. Roughly put, we find that 
stability implies a number of (progressively  stronger) restrictions 
on out-of-equilibrium  beliefs in this simple class of games. Some of 
the  restrictions we  find  quite  intuitive; for  example, stability 
implies the intuitive restriction given above. As the restrictions 
mount, however,  our intuition becomes progressively  weaker;  until 
we come to implications of stability that we (at least) are unable to 
motivate so  nicely. In  the  end, we have mixed feelings about 
stability, at least insofar  as it applies to signaling  games:  it captures 
quite beautifully some restrictions that we find very satisfactory; 
but in other cases it seems very strong. 
We have two objectives in this study. Our first concern is with 
signaling games alone. These  games, and elaborations of  these 
games,  have proved  to be very important  to recent work  in theoreti- 
cal microeconomics. By developing a sequence of  (progressively 
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to provide analysts with a general language for the discussion of 
what level of restrictions they must impose in order to obtain a 
particular equilibrium outcome. Second, the theory of stability, 
either as it stands or as it develops, will certainly prove to be an 
important idea in noncooperative  game theory. We hope that our 
examples and characterization  of stability for signaling games will 
help in the further  general  development of these ideas. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  We begin, in Section II, with 
an example that illustrates the basic program  that we are following. 
Then, in Section III we introduce a general framework for our 
analysis. In subsection 111.1  we define the general signaling game, 
and we recall in  subsection 111.2  some propositions concerning 
equilibria of extensive games from the  literature. In subsection 
III.3, we recall basic concepts and definitions from Kohlberg and 
Mertens [1986], with emphasis on a particular result that  they 
give. 
Section IV is the heart of the paper. The general  program  that 
we follow for restricting beliefs in testing equilibrium  outcomes of 
signaling  games and the connection of this program  to stability are 
given in subsection IV.1. The rest of Section IV develops some 
specifications  of the general program:  subsection IV.2 concerns  the 
well-known and much used criterion of domination. Subsection 
IV.3 takes up what we call equilibrium  domination;  included  here is 
the criterion  that follows from the "speech"  given above, which we 
refer to as the Intuitive Criterion (the uppercase  letters signifying 
this particular criterion). Subsection IV.4 briefly discusses (varia- 
tions on) the Banks and Sobel [forthcoming]  criteria  of divinity and 
universal  divinity. And subsection IV.5 discusses the "never  a weak 
best response"  criterion  of Kohlberg  and Mertens [1986]. 
In Section V we apply these various  criteria  to a simple version 
of Spence's signaling model, showing how they work  to rule out all 
but a single equilibrium  outcome in the game (namely the separat- 
ing equilibrium  identified by Riley [1979]). We conclude in Section 
VI with a discussion  of the full implications  of stability for signaling 
games, and with a summary  of what (we think) we have learned. 
McLennan [1985] pioneers the  approach of  refining Nash 
equilibria  by formal restrictions on out-of-equilibrium  beliefs. His 
approach differs from our own in one important respect, and we 
shall offer a few remarks  on this in subsection IV.3. He should be 
credited, however, with initiating the general program we follow 
here. 
Contemporaneously,  Banks and Sobel [forthcoming]  have ana- SIGNALING  GAMES  AND STABLE  EQUILIBRIA  183 
lyzed the same basic problem as do we, arriving at very similar 
answers.  We have benefited from seeing their results, and we have, 
for completeness, related their criteria of divinity and universal 
divinity to our approach. They should be given all the credit for 
those two criteria, and (at least) equal credit for other results that 
appear in both papers. The reader will benefit from reading their 
treatment of these issues. Also, we are greatly indebted to Kohlberg 
and Mertens [1986] for many of the ideas here. In particular,  they 
are responsible  for the "never  a weak best response"  criterion  that 
dominates our mathematical  analysis. 
Because our focus here is on simple signaling games, many 
interesting questions that arise in games with a richer dynamic 
structure  are moot. Cho [1986,  forthcoming]  presents an analysis of 
some of our ideas, adapted to more interesting games. McLennan 
[1985] also deals with general  extensive games. 
II. A SIMPLE  EXAMPLE 
The basic ideas in this paper are illustrated by the following 
simple game. The reader  should refer to Figure I throughout. 
We tell the story of a two-player game with incomplete infor- 
mation concerning  one of the two. The first player  is called A, and A 
either is a wimp or is surly. Nature has selected the disposition of A, 
with probability  0.9 that the A selected is surly. In terms of Figure  I, 
nature has chosen to start the game at one of the two open dots 
labeled tw  (for the wimp) and t, (for the surly type of A). The prior 
beer  tw  quiche 
0~~~~~~~~ 
,,  :'v  -  {.1}  IIQ04 
beer  ts  quiche  I 
G{R9}  I 
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probability  of nature's choice is indicated by the numbers in curly 
brackets. 
At the start of the game, A knows his own disposition or type, 
and A is faced with the choice of what breakfast to have, before 
setting off for the day. The choices available are quiche and beer. 
These choices are denoted by the pairs of arrows  pointing out from 
the open dots. A's preferences  concerning  breakfast  depends on his 
type: if A is a wimp, he derives incremental payoff 1 for having 
quiche and 0 from beer; if A is surly, beer is worth 1, and quiche is 
worth 0. 
After breakfast, A meets with B. There are four conceivable 
circumstances under which the meeting could take place, corre- 
sponding  to the two types of A and the two types of breakfast;  these 
are depicted by the four filled dots. B, at this meeting, chooses 
whether to  duel  A. B's  choices are represented by the  arrows 
emanating  from the  four filled  dots.  When B  chooses  whether  to 
duel,  he  does  so  knowing  what  A  had  for  breakfast,  but  not 
knowing for sure what is A's type. This is depicted  in the picture by 
the dashed lines connecting pairs of solid dots, representing the 
information sets of B-to  the right is the information  set of B if he 
knows that  A had quiche for breakfast, and to  the  left  is the 
information  set of B if he has observed  A have beer. 
B's  choice whether to  duel  effectively ends  the  game. A, 
whether surly or not, wishes that B choose not to duel. We imagine 
that A gets (incremental)  payoff 2 if B chooses not to duel, and 0 if B 
does duel. A's total payoff (the sum of the two increments) is the 
first number in each column vector, at the end of each sequence of 
choices (by nature, then A, and then B). B wishes to duel with A if 
and only if A is a wimp-B's  payoffs, reflecting  this, are the second 
number  in each column  vector. 
Note well that it is more important (in terms of payoff) to A 
that  he  deter B  from dueling than that  he  have his  preferred 
breakfast. And B's  prior on what type  is A would, absent any 
further information,  induce B to avoid the duel. 
This extensive game has two Nash equilibrium outcomes. In 
the first, A, regardless  of type, has beer for breakfast.  B, having seen 
a breakfast  of beer, will not duel-this  makes sense as (anticipating 
A's strategy) B's posterior, given a breakfast of beer, is that A is 
surly with  (prior) probability 0.9.  Now  to  make this  a  Nash 
equilibrium,  we must keep the wimpish A from having a breakfast 
of quiche-this  will happen if, upon seeing a breakfast  of quiche, A 
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"make sense" of such a reaction by B to a quiche breakfast as 
follows: quiche is taken as a sign that A is a wimp; B revises his 
probability assessment that A is a wimp to 0.5 (or more). If this 
"posterior  probability"  is 0.5, then B is indifferent  between dueling 
or not; if it exceeds 0.5, then B strictly prefers  to duel. Note that, at 
the  equilibria we have described, B's "posterior beliefs" at the 
quiche information  set are not computable using Bayes' rule, since 
there is zero prior  probability  that B will observe  the event (quiche 
for breakfast)  that he is meant to condition upon. But there do exist 
beliefs at this out-of-equilibrium  information set that rationalize 
B's dueling (with sufficiently high probability). That is to say, the 
equilibrium  outcome is sequential. 
The second equilibrium  outcome is much like the first, except 
that the breakfast changes. A, regardless of type, has quiche for 
breakfast. Seeing quiche for breakfast, then, B learns nothing; his 
posterior on A's type is the prior, and B chooses to avoid the duel. 
To keep the surly A from having a breakfast  of beer, B, in the event 
of a beer breakfast, duels with probability 0.5 or more. And this 
response by  B  to  the  out-of-equilibrium meal of  beer can be 
rationalized;  B's out of equilibrium  "posterior  beliefs" are that, if A 
has beer, A is a wimp with probability  0.5 or more. 
This multiplicity of equilibria, and their source, is typical of 
this type of signaling game. (A general definition will be given 
shortly.) Even if we insist that B  rationalize responses to  out- 
of-equilibrium  messages (such as A's choice of breakfast)  with some 
beliefs as to A's type, the wealth of possible out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs gives us a wealth of out-of-equilibrium  responses by B. And, 
therefore, many equilibrium choices of  message by  A  can  be 
supported. 
But,  in the  second equilibrium, are B's  out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs sensible? Here is an argument  to say that they are not. If this 
is the  equilibrium, then  a wimpish A will net  utility  3  at the 
equilibrium.  (He gets his preferred  breakfast  of quiche and no duel 
in the bargain.)  By having beer for breakfast,  the very best he could 
do is a payoff of 2. Sending the out-of-equilibrium  message "beer 
for breakfast"  makes no sense for him. But it might make sense for 
the surly A to have this breakfast,  in that, in equilibrium,  the surly 
A receives 2 in equilibrium, and he can conceivably get 3 from a 
breakfast  of beer. Suppose then that B is restricted  to beliefs which 
put no weight on the wimpish  A having  beer for breakfast.  (Think in 
terms of removing  from the game the possibility that a wimpish A 
could have beer.) In this case, the only beliefs B could hold are that 186  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OFECONOMICS 
A must be surly,  and  B would  not duel. If the surly  A realizes  all this, 
he knows that he can have his beer and safely anticipate no duel. 
This breaks  the second equilibrium. 
The  first equilibrium is  unbroken by  such  considerations. 
There it is quiche that is the out-of-equilibrium  meal. The surly A 
has no reason to defect (getting 3 in equilibrium, and getting a 
maximum of 2 if he has quiche), whereas the wimp could conceiv- 
ably gain by a defection. So, in the spirit of the previous  paragraph, 
we would say that B should rule out the possibility that it is the 
surly A that is sending the out-of-equilibrium  message. This causes 
B, in the event of receiving that message, to hold a "posterior" 
assessment  that he faces a wimp,  which in turn causes him to choose 
to  duel.  But  this  supports  the  equilibrium outcome we  have 
described. 
To take the argument  a level further, consider the variation in 
Figure  II. Here we have given B three options:  to duel;  to walk away; 
to give A $1,000,000. This third option does not affect the set of 
equilibria, since giving away the million is always a dominated 
strategy  for B. But this third option does ruin the specific argument 
we gave against the  "quiche for breakfast" equilibria. We said 
before that  B  should  discount the  possibility  that  an  out-of- 
equilibrium  breakfast  of beer comes from the wimpish A, since this 
type of A could conceivably  benefit from this defection, relative to 
/20  don't  beer  tw  quiche  d  .  don't  '30 
?24  TV  ?~~~{.1}  I7  ?  0  I 
(1000002  )  1  I 
's(  1000003 
-999999  1000000 
I0  1 
/3)  don'  I  beer  t.  quiche  on't  12\ 
1000003)  H  L'  (1000002) 
(-1000000  999999 
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what he gets in equilibrium.  When we add the third response for B, 
we can no longer say that the wimpish  A cannot conceivably  benefit 
from a defection-he  does benefit if this induces B to give him the 
million. We must modify our test to read: could the wimpish A 
benefit from the out-of-equilibrium breakfast, relative to his in- 
equilibrium expected payoff, for any response by B to this out- 
of-equilibrium breakfast that B might conceivably take? Define 
"responses that  B  might  conceivably take" as  those  that  are 
undominated by other available responses. Then with this modifi- 
cation, we again dispose of the quiche for breakfast  outcome. 
It is this type of argument that we formalize here. We give 
answers to the following questions: what is the precise criterion 
being applied in this example, and what are other, similar criteria? 
Can we be assured that  some equilibrium outcome will always 
survive  a given criterion?  And we shall seek to connect these criteria 
to formal  refinements  of Nash equilibrium,  and especially  to stabil- 
ity. To do so requires  some formal  setup and a review  of stability. 
III.  FORMULATION  AND PRELIMINARIES 
1. Signaling Games 
We focus in this paper on what we call the general signaling 
game with two players.  The first,  player  A, receives  private informa- 
tion. Following standard practice, we shall say that this  player 
learns his type t, drawn from a finite set T. The player's type is 
drawn according  to some probability distribution or  over T that is 
common knowledge. Player A, having learned his type, sends a 
message m to player  B chosen out of some finite set M. We allow  the 
set of messages available to A to depend upon A's type; we write 
M(t) for the set of messages available  to type t, and T(m) for the set 
of types that have available  the message m. Player B, having heard 
this message, chooses a response r from a finite set of responses R. 
We  allow the  available responses to  depend  on  the  message 
received, writing R  (m). The game ends with this  response, and 
payoffs are made to the two players, depending on the type of 
player A, the message A sent, and the response B took. The utility 
payoff to player A is denoted u(tmr),  and the utility to player B is 
denoted v(t,m,r). 
There are very simple games in extensive form, and one can 
describe  their (sequential)  equilibria  very easily. Some notation will 
be helpful:  we shall write behavior  strategies for player A as p(m;t), 
where, for each t, p(  *  ;t) is a probability  distribution over M(t). The 188  QUARTERLYJOURNAL  OFECONOMICS 
interpretation  is that t sends m with probability  p(m;t). For behav- 
ior strategies  of player B, we shall write 4(r;m), where, for each m, 
4((-;m) is a probability  distribution  on R(m);  the  interpretation  is 
that B, observing m, chooses response r with probability  4(r;m). 
When  player  B  chooses  a  response  r  in  response  to  some 
message  m, he does so (in any sequential  equilibrium,  at least)  on 
the  basis  of some  posterior  probability  assessment  A over the  set 
T(m) of types of player A who might have sent that message. Write 
BR (gt,m)  for that subset of R of best responses  (for player B)  to m if 
player B has posterior assessment  gi.  That is, 
BR (pzm) = arg maxreR(m)  L  v(t,m,r) p(t). 
t G T(m) 
For subsets  I of T(m), let BR(I,m)  denote  the set of best responses 
by B to probability  assessments  concentrated  on the set I. That  is, 
BR(I,m)  =  U  BR(gm). 
I$:M(I)=1) 
Write MBR  (pzm) and MBR (I,m) for the mixed best responses  by B 
to, respectively,  beliefs  At  and any beliefs whose support is 1.1 
A Nash  equilibrium  for a signaling  game  is described  by the 
obvious  conditions:  given B's  strategy  X, each type  t evaluates  the 
utility  from sending message  m as Xru(tir)4(rm),  and p(  ;t) puts 
weight on m only if it is among the maximizing  m's in this expected 
utility.  And given A's strategy  p, B proceeds  in two steps: first, for 
any  message  m that  is  sent  with  positive  probability  by  some  t, 
B  uses  Bayes'  rule  to  compute  the  posterior  assessment  that  m 
comes  from  each  type  t  E  T(m)  as  g(tjm)  =  [7r(t)p(m;t)]/ 
[Yt'GT(m)  w(t')p(m;t')].  And then the Nash condition  is that for all m 
that  are  sent  by  some  type  t  with  positive  probability,  every 
response r in the support of B's response must be a best response to 
m given beliefs  Auf  I  m) that  are computed  using Bayes'  rule; or, in 
symbols, 
(1)  4)(.;m)  (E MBR (,u(  I  m),m). 
To require that the Nash equilibrium is sequential  is to add the 
requirement  that,  for  every  message  m  that  is  sent  with  zero 
probability  by A (for all m such that  Xt7r(t)p(m;t) = 0), there must 
1. Note well that while MBR(j,m) is the set of probability  distributions  over 
BR(ji,m), MBR(Im)  may  be  smaller than  all  probability distributions over 
BR(I,m)-for  each O E  MBR  (Im), we must produce  a single A  with support  I such 
that O  E  MBR  (jm).  The example  in subsection  IV.5 demonstrates  this. SIGNALING  GAMES  AND STABLE  EQUILIBRIA  189 
be some probability distribution over types T(m), which we shall 
write pi(- I  m),  such that (1) holds. That is, B's  responses to out- 
of-equilibrium  messages  must be rationalized  by some beliefs on the 
part of B. The general program  we shall follow is to restrict the set 
of  sequential equilibria by posing restrictions on these  out-of- 
equilibrium  beliefs. 
2. Three Facts  about the Equilibria  of Games 
We next wish to record  three useful facts about the sets of Nash 
and sequential equilibria  of various classes of games. The first fact 
holds for all noncooperative  games with finitely many players, each 
of whom has finitely many pure strategies. It is given by Kohlberg 
and Mertens [1985]. 
FACT  1. The set of Nash equilibria (and also sequential equilibria) 
of any finite player, finite pure strategy noncooperative  game, 
viewed as a set of probability distributions over the product 
space of pure strategy profiles, consists of a finite number of 
connected sets. 
The second fact pertains to games that are generic for a given 
extensive form. By this is meant:  fix any (finite player,  finite action) 
extensive form. Fix as well the probability distributions for any 
moves by nature. Let Z denote the set of terminal endpoints for the 
extensive form, and let  I  denote the  set  of players. Then  the 
specification  of the game is completed by an assignment of payoffs 
to the players, one for each player at each point in Z. That is, the 
space  of games  over  the  given  extensive  form  is  RZxI  (where  I? 
denotes the real line). A statement is said to be true for generic 
extensive games if,  for every fixed (finite) extensive form and 
probability distribution for nature's moves, the set of payoffs (for 
that  form) for which the  statement is  false has closure whose 
Lebesgue  measure  in IZxI  is zero.  Put another  way, if a statement is 
generically  true in this sense, and if the payoffs  for a given extensive 
form are chosen from  J1ZXI at random, according to some probabil- 
ity distribution  that is absolutely continuous  with respect to Lebes- 
gue measure,  then there is probability 1 that the statement is true 
for all games in an open neighborhood  of the payoffs chosen. 
We require one  further piece  of terminology. For a  given 
extensive form with terminal endpoints Z, each strategy profile (an 
assignment of one strategy for each player) induces a probability 
distribution over which endpoint is reached. Fixing the strategy 
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associated with the strategy profile. If a particular  outcome is the 
outcome for some Nash equilibrium, call it a Nash  equilibrium 
outcome. If it is the outcome of a sequential equilibrium,  call it a 
sequential  equilibrium  outcome,  and so forth.  With all this  build- 
up,  the  following is  shown by  Kreps and Wilson [1982a] and 
Kohlberg  and Mertens [1986]. 
FACT  2. For generic extensive games, the set of Nash equilibrium 
outcomes consists of a finite number  of points. 
This means that, while the set of Nash equilibria for an extensive 
form game may be infinite, the infinite variety (generically) con- 
cerns out-of-equilibrium  actions and reactions. 
Because the map from strategy profiles  to outcomes is continu- 
ous,  facts  1  and  2  combine to  establish the  following simple 
corollary: 
FACT  3. For generic extensive games, a single equilibrium  outcome 
is  associated with  each  individual connected set  of  Nash 
equilibria  (cf. Fact 1). 
The structure that is implied for generic extensive games by 
these three facts is illustrated by the beer-quiche example. In this 
example there  are two  connected sets  of  equilibria, each  one 
resembling  a line segment. The first set of equilibria  corresponds  to 
the outcome where both types have beer for breakfast,  followed by 
no dueling.  The set of equilibria  associated  with this outcome arises 
from the many possible equilibrium responses by B  to  an out- 
of-equilibrium breakfast of quiche, namely any (mixed strategy) 
response that puts weight 0.5 or more on dueling. Similarly, the 
equilibrium outcome of quiche-no duel is associated with a line 
segment of equilibria,  arising  from many possible responses by B to 
the out-of-equilibrium  breakfast  of beer. 
Note that genericity for our signaling games is defined in the 
space of all payoff assignments to all endpoints. Thus, in applying 
Fact 2, we cannot be confident that there are a finite number of 
outcomes for a signaling game that is randomly selected from the 
subspace of signaling  games in which the message sent by A has no 
impact on B's utility, or where A's message selection has no impact 
on  either  player's payoffs. There  may  be  a  finite  number of 
equilibrium outcomes for such games-witness  the  beer-quiche 
game. But we cannot appeal to Fact 2 to justify an assumption that 
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outcomes.  In the analysis to follow, we almost always fix a signaling 
game and  assume that  it  has  a  finite  number of  equilibrium 
outcomes,  justifying this assumption  by appeal to Fact 2. Thus, our 
justification is not valid for the games analyzed by Crawford  and 
Sobel [1982] or Farrell [1985]. (In any event, the criteria that we 
subsequently develop would not  have force in  games in  which 
signals are costless to the sender.) 
3. Stability-A  Review 
Kohlberg  and Mertens [1986] develop a number of criteria  for 
Nash equilibria  and sets of Nash equilibria  that fit under  the general 
rubric  of stability. It is not our intention  to repeat  their development 
in detail;  the reader  is urged  to read  their paper  to get a complete  feel 
for their intentions and accomplishments.  (In particular,  it is very 
important  to understand  why they have moved from Selten's [1965, 
1975]  basic program  of perfecting  individual  equilibria  to a consider- 
ation of "perfect" (strategically  stable) sets of equilibria).  But to 
make this paper close to self-contained, salient features of their 
development  will be summarized  in this subsection. 
Suppose that we have a class of games F on which some metric 
is defined. Let I be the space of strategy profiles for games from F, 
also endowed with some metric. Let N:  F =- I  be the Nash corre- 
spondence. For a particular  game -y  Q F, a subset M C N(-y) of the 
Nash equilibria  of y  is said to be stable if for every  E  > 0 there is a 6 > 
o such that every game  y' that is within 6 of -y has some Nash 
equilibrium  that is less than E  distant from the set M. 
This may seem rather  a strong condition, but if we allow much 
latitude in selecting the set M, it is rather weak. For most sensible 
metrics on games, the Nash correspondence  is upper hemi-continu- 
ous. In such cases, one stable set of equilibria  for the game  oy  is N('y), 
the set of all equilibria  of y.  But N(-y) is "large";  one is interested in 
showing  that a set of equilibria  smaller  than N(,y) is stable. 
This  is  the  basic mathematical structure in  Kohlberg and 
Mertens [1986]. (The definitions that we use come from earlier 
versions of their paper and vary somewhat from their most recent 
treatment. We shall alert the reader  to the single important  distinc- 
tion near  the end of this section). For the space of games  F, they fix a 
Normal form-a  positive integer number  I of players, and, for each 
player i = 1, ...  ,I,  a positive  integer  number si of pure strategies, 
and they consider  for F all assignments  of utilities to (pure) strategy 
profiles.  That is, F =  (_WSlS2...  S)I.  And the space of strategy  profiles  I is 
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form (always with the usual Euclidean  metric). As for the metric on 
r, they work with three, corresponding to their notions  of hypersta- 
bility,  full stability,  and (plain) stability.  Hyperstability,  for exam- 
ple,  corresponds  to the  standard  Euclidean  metric  on F. Stability 
(which  we  shall  deal  with  in  the  sequel)  is  defined  as follows.  A 
neighborhood  base for the game  y is generated  by taking, for each 
5 >  0, the set of all games  y'  whose payoffs can be realized as follows: 
for each player i there  is a (mixed)  strategy  a'  and a real number 
Qi  C  [0,5] such that the outcome to player j in A'  if the players chose 
strategies  vi, respectively,  is the  outcome  in game -y if they  choose 
the  strategies  Fr*j +  (1 -  5)aj.  (Kohlberg  and  Mertens  have  a* 
completely  mixed and bi E  (0,5); we have closed these so that we can 
rephrase their construction  in terms  of a topology  on the  space  of 
games.) 
In  what  follows,  we  shall  use  stability  only.  But  the  reader 
should note that the basic existence  result, given below as Fact 4, is 
true for hyperstability,  and so much of our analysis  can be carried 
over to that stronger criterion. 
Since  the  Nash  correspondence  is  upper  hemi-continuous  in 
the  metric  of stability,  the  set N(,y)  is always  stable.  The  idea,  as 
indicated  above,  is to find smaller  stable  sets.  For games  that  are 
generic  in the normal form, that is rather too easy to do; it turns out 
that stability  per se adds no restrictions  to the original definition  of 
Nash. Let us explain: genericity  in the normal form is defined in the 
obvious  way, where  the  space  of payoffs  is taken  to  be  all payoff 
assignments  over the  normal  form. Now  if we think  of  a game  in 
normal form as a trivial game in extensive  form (where there is one 
information  set per player, at which the  player chooses  among his 
pure  strategies),  Fact  2 is  seen  to  imply  that,  for generic  normal 
form games, there are a finite number of Nash equilibria. Moreover, 
Kohlberg  and  Mertens  [1986]  establish  that,  for  generic  normal 
form games, each of these  Nash  equilibria, taken as a singleton  set, 
is stable  (and even hyperstable). 
Stability  acquires  cutting  power  (for  generic  games)  when 
applied to normal form games that arise from and are generic for a 
given extensive  form. Consider, for example,  the signaling  game of 
Section  III.  The  space  of  payoffs  for  the  extensive  game  has 
dimension  (TMR)2  (where we use the  uppercase  letters  to denote 
both  the  sets  and the  cardinality  of the  sets,  and we assume,  for 
purposes of this paragraph, that M(t)  M and R (m)-  R). Viewed 
as a normal form game, though, A has MT pure strategies,  and B has 
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(MTRM)2.  Clearly, a generic set of payoffs for the extensive  form will 
typically  be a very small set in the set of all payoffs for the normal 
form, so knowing that  a statement  is true for generic normal form 
games tells us nothing  about the truth of statement  for payoffs that 
arise generically in the underlying  extensive  form. 
Indeed,  fixing  an  extensive  form,  for  games  that  arise  from 
payoffs generic in the extensive  form, there are sometimes  infinitely 
many Nash  equilibria  (e.g., in the beer-quiche  example).  And it is 
sometimes  the case that  no single equilibrium,  taken as a singleton 
set, will be stable. Kohlberg and Mertens  [1986], however, establish 
the following basic existence  result: recall that  the set of equilibria 
(for any finite game) consists  of a finite number of connected  sets. 
FACT  4.  For any finite game, some one (or more) of those connected 
sets of equilibria, taken by itself,  is stable. 
Since,  by Fact  3, in generic extensive  games each connected  set  of 
equilibria  is associated  with  a single  equilibrium  outcome,  we can 
enlist  Kohlberg  and Mertens'  [1986] basic existence  result  to say: 
generic  extensive  games  possess  at  least  one  stable  equilibrium 
outcome,  where  an  equilibrium  outcome  is  stable  if  the  set  of 
equilibria  that  give  rises  to  it  is  a stable  set.  That  is,  for generic 
extensive  games,  while  we  cannot  guarantee  the  existence  of  an 
equilibrium  that  is stable  as a singleton  set, we can guarantee that 
some single equilibrium  outcome is stable. 
Moreover, while for games generic in their normal form every 
Nash  equilibrium  is  stable,  it  is  not  the  case  that,  for  generic 
extensive  games,  each  equilibrium  outcome  is  stable.  That  is, 
stability  as a criterion for equilibrium  outcomes  does have cutting 
power in generic  extensive  games.  It  is this  cutting  power,  in the 
context  of signaling games, that we investigate. 
In  doing  so,  we  make  use  of  a  result  from  Kohlberg  and 
Mertens  [1986]. This requires a piece of terminology: take any game 
and  any  set  of equilibria  for the  game.  A strategy  for one  of the 
players  is  said  to  be  never  a  weak  best  response  for  the  player, 
relative  to the  set of equilibria,  if in no equilibrium  from the set is 
the  strategy  in  question  as  good  for  the  player  as  the  strategy 
prescribed by the equilibrium. 
FACT 5.  Suppose that we are given a set of equilibria for a game and 
a particular  pure  strategy  for  a given  player  that  is  never  a 
weak best response  for the player relative  to the set.  Consider 
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form) entirely, and consider the subset of the original stable set 
of equilibria that consists  of all strategy profiles from the set in 
which the given player puts zero weight on the particular pure 
strategy. This subset is stable in the game that results after the 
particular strategy for the player is "pruned." The same is true 
if the  strategy  for the  player  that  is pruned  is weakly  domi- 
nated by some other strategy for the player. 
The  reader should  be warned that  the terminology  we are using is 
not quite consistent  with Kohlberg and Mertens  [1986].  The impor- 
tant difference is that they reserve the term stable  set for a minimal 
(by set inclusion)  closed  set of Nash  equilibria  having the stability 
property we have given. It is easier for us to to use the term stable 
set for any set of equilibria which has the stability  property, and we 
shall  do so.2 It  makes  no difference  to  the  results,  as long  as one 
defines a stable equilibrium  outcome as a single outcome that is the 
projection  of some (minimal)  stable  set of equilibria.  This warning 
is  particularly  apt  here,  as  the  reader  searching  for  Fact  5  in 
Kohlberg  and  Mertens  will  find  a slightly  different  formulation; 
namely, the subset contains  a stable set of equilibria. 
We  require  a  couple  of  preliminary  results,  concerning  the 
connection  between signaling games and stable equilibria. We state 
them in a single lemma. 
LEMMA  1.  Fix  a  signaling  game.  Suppose  that  an  equilibrium 
outcome  is stable, in the sense that the set of all the equilibria 
that give rise to the outcome  is a stable  set. Then  the set of all 
sequential  equilibria  that  give  rise  to  the  outcome  is  also  a 
stable  set. Also, every stable  set of equilibria  contains  at least 
one sequential  equilibrium. 
The  condition  that  the  game  is  a signaling  game  is needed  here: 
Kohlberg  and  Mertens  [1986]  present  an  example  (which  they 
attribute  to  Gul) of a game having  a stable  set  of equilibria,  each 
member  of  which  gives  an  outcome  different  from  the  unique 
sequential  equilibrium  of  the  game.  (That  is,  not  only  does  the 
stable set not contain any sequential  equilibrium; every equilibrium 
in the  stable  set  gives  an equilibrium  outcome  different  from the 
unique  sequential  equilibrium  outcome.)  What saves us from such 
an unhappy  situation  here  is that,  for signaling  games,  equilibria 
that  are perfect  in the  normal form are also sequential.  From the 
2.  Our usage  is  consistent  with  the  1982 and  1983  versions  of Kohlberg  and 
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definition of stability, it  is  easy to  see that  every stable set of 
equilibria contains some equilibrium  that is perfect in the normal 
form. (See Kohlberg  and Mertens [1986,  p. 1028].) And it is likewise 
easy to show  that, for a given stable set of equilibria,  the subset of all 
normal  form perfect equilibria  in that set will be stable. 
IV.  SELECTION  GUIDE 
1. The General Program 
We have finally gotten through the preliminaries,  and we can 
outline the general  program  of the paper. 
Recall the beer-quiche  example. We fixed a particular  equilib- 
rium outcome, and we restricted B's out-of-equilibrium  beliefs by 
giving and applying a criterion for saying that a particular out- 
of-equilibrium  message was "unreasonable"  for a particular type. 
The criterion used there was that type t would not reasonably be 
expected by B to send out-of-equilibrium  message m if the best t 
could do from m was less than t got at the equilibrium outcome. 
This is but one criterion  we might think of, and, later in this section, 
we shall formalize  it and others. In the variation  on beer-quiche,  we 
found that this criterion might be sharpened by first discarding 
"unreasonable"  responses by B to certain out-of-equilibrium  mes- 
sages. The criterion  used there was that response r to message m is 
unreasonable  if it is dominated by some other response. We shall 
use a criterion  that is equivalent to this for ruling out responses to 
messages in what follows. 
After  restricting B's  out-of-equilibrium beliefs,  we  asked 
whether the originally fixed equilibrium outcome could be "sup- 
ported"  by out-of-equilibrium  beliefs that obey the restrictions. In 
the case of the equilibrium outcome where both types ate quiche, 
the answer was no, because B's out-of-equilibrium beliefs would 
cause the surly type of A to defect. 
We formalize  all this as follows:  for a given signaling  game with 
a finite number of equilibrium outcomes, fix some one of those 
outcomes.  Let u*  (t) denote the expected utility of type t in the fixed 
equilibrium outcome. Construct a test  of that  outcome in  two 
steps. 
STEP 1. Pose  some  criterion for saying that  a  particular out- 
of-equilibrium  message cannot "reasonably"  be expected to be 
sent by a particular type. In each of the four subsections to 
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Also, say that message m will never "reasonably"  be expected 
to be met with response r if rag  BR(T(m),m). 
Now specify some order and number of times for applying 
these two criteria. Apply the first by deleting from M(t), for each 
type t, any out-of-equilibrium  message m such that (t,m) is "unrea- 
sonable."  Apply the second by deleting from R (m), for each out of 
equilibrium  message m, any response rig BR (T(m),m). Apply the 
two iteratively,  in an order,  and for a number  of times that is part of 
the specification of the test.' That is, the order and number of 
applications, together  with  the  criterion used  to  strike  type- 
message pairs, is the specification  of step 1 of the test. 
When step  1 is completed, we shall have, for each out-of- 
equilibrium  message m, a set of types that have not been ruled out 
for that message. Call this set of types Ts(m). 
STEP 2.  For  each  out-of-equilibrium  message  m,  consider  all 
sequential equilibrium responses of B  to  m in the  original 
game. Are any of these sequentially rational for B, given that 
B's beliefs are restricted to Ts(m)? If not, then the equilibrium 
outcome has failed the test. (If so, it has passed.) 
(It may happen that Ts(m) is empty. In this case, to pass the 
test, it is necessary that, for every probability distribution gi on 
T(m), there is some 0 Q MBR(gi,m) that supports the equilibrium 
outcome in the original  game.) 
We shall be attempting in Step 1 (as we delete type-message 
and message-response  pairs) to make restrictions  in B's beliefs that 
are intuitive in the  sense that  no one playing the  game would 
reasonably expect  B  to  put  positive  weight, given  an  out-of- 
equilibrium  message m, on a type t that has been excluded for m. If 
one were trying to envisage the thought process of the players, we 
might imagine two stages to Step 1. First, there is the asserted fact 
that, given the equilibrium outcome, a given out of equilibrium 
message is not sensible for certain of the types of A. Second, insofar 
as this asserted fact is held by the players to be correct,  introspec- 
tion on their part will tell them that B will attach zero weight to this 
out-of-equilibrium message coming from those types, which will 
cause B to consider only certain responses to the message. This 
restriction on B's responses, if believed by all to be valid, may lead 
3. In the variation  on beer-quiche,  we saw that applying the second criterion 
could sharpen the first. Since the first will "reduce"  T(m) for a given m, it will 
sharpen  the second. Examples are easy to concoct to show that iterating back and 
forth can lead to continued reductions  in the set of types that are reasonable  for a 
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to more asserted facts  about which types of A might conceivably 
send the given out-of-equilibrium  messages; introspection by the 
players concerning this  will lead to  further restrictions on B's 
responses, and so on. Since this cycle (and its consequences  in Step 
2) depends on both players coming to these conclusions through 
introspection, our success in this endeavor will depend upon the 
extent to which the asserted facts  (the criterion used to delete 
type-message pairs) are judged to be intuitive, and on the number 
of iterations that are required. (Restrictions made in one or a few 
iterations are presumably easier to swallow than restrictions that 
require many iterations, since each level of introspection requires 
faith that the other side has made it to the previous  level.) 
Having made those restrictions, in Step 2 we suppose that 
everyone expects B to respond to an out-of-equilibrium  message m 
that is based on beliefs which give no weight to types that have been 
excluded  for that message.  With this supposition can we continue to 
sustain  the equilibrium outcome? Again envisaging the thought 
process of the players, we have in mind something like Kohlberg 
and Merten's  process of forward  induction:  will some type of player 
A, having  arrived  introspectively  at restrictions  in B's beliefs (hence 
B's conceivable actions), see that deviation will lead to a higher 
payoff than will following  the equilibrium? 
Note that we shall fail Step 2 if and only if there is some 
out-of-equilibrium  message  m  such  that,  for  every  X  E 
MBR(TS(m),m),  there  is  some  type  t  E  T(m)  with  u*(t)  < 
2ru(tmr)4k(r).  We  can  pose  a  slightly  weaker test,  by  asking 
whether there is some single type t (for the given m) that would 
send m no matter what response  B picks out of BR(Ts(m),m). That 
is, to fail the weaker  test, the restrictions  from Step 1 must suffice  to 
give us a single type who will then certainly wish to break the 
equilibrium; in  Step  2  as  formulated, we  rely  on  the  (usual) 
assumption  that B's out-of-equilibrium  response to m is commonly 
known to all types of A. The weaker test, when failed, may be 
slightly more convincing as evidence against the fixed equilibrium 
outcome,  so we shall consider,  in the sequel, tests that are composed 
of some specification  of Step 1, followed by this variation  in Step 2, 
which we refer to as Step 2A.4 
4. The reader  may  wonder  whether  a type that has been excluded  for  message  m 
in Step 1 might subsequently  prove  to be the undoing  of the equilibrium  in Step 2 or 
2A, in the sense that, with B's beliefs restricted  by Step 1 to exclude type t, B will 
respond  to m in a manner  that causes  t to send m. If we could  be sure  that this would 
not happen, then we could pose Step  2 a bit more simply, as: is the  original 
equilibrium  outcome  still a sequential  equilibrium  outcome in the game  where  only 
types t  e  T'(m) can send m? We shall return to this issue in subsection IV.5, at 
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Besides posing "intuitive tests" of equilibrium outcomes in 
signaling  games, we follow the program  above in order  to relate our 
tests to Kohlberg-Mertens  stability. We seek, in general, to show 
that  any  equilibrium outcome that  fails  any  of  the  tests  we 
construct fails as well to be a stable equilibrium outcome. To do 
this, we apply Fact 5, Lemma 1, and the following  lemma. 
LEMMA  2. For signaling games, if a response r is not sequentially 
rational for B in response to message m' for some beliefs over 
T(m'),  then it is dominated  by some convex combination  of B's 
other available  responses. 
This is a simple application of the separating hyperplane theorem 
and is left to the reader. 
This lemma shows that deletion of message-response pairs 
according  to the "never  sequentially rational"  criterion is a special 
case of deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Fact 5, therefore, 
implies that any time we begin with a stable set of equilibria in a 
given signaling game, what remains of the  set  is  stable in the 
signaling game that results from the pruning of any such message- 
response pairs.5  Suppose, then, that the criterion  used in Step 1 to 
delete type-message pairs also falls under the "permitted catego- 
ries" of  Fact  5.  The  iterated application of  Fact  5  is  clearly 
legitimate, so if the set of equilibria is stable to begin with, what 
remains  of it must remain so after as many of these deletions as we 
care to make. Now invoke Lemma 1. In a signaling game with a 
finite number  of equilibrium  outcomes,  suppose that some outcome 
is stable. Then the set of all sequential equilibria  giving rise to that 
outcome is stable, according to the first half of Lemma 1. The 
iterated deletion  from this  set  of  type-message and  message- 
response  pairs  according  to any criteria  that are permitted by Fact 5 
will leave us at each stage with a stable set of equilibria that are 
sequential for the original  game. When this is completed, apply the 
second half of Lemma 1 to extract an equilibrium  from this set that 
is sequential for the reduced  game. Necessarily,  B's response in this 
equilibrium  must be a best response  to beliefs on the types in Ts(m). 
Hence the test  in Step  2 would be passed. We summarize this 
discussion as 
PROPOSITION  1. Insofar as the deletion of type-message pairs falls 
under either category permitted by Fact 5, any equilibrium 
outcome that fails our test fails to be stable. 
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Moreover, the Kohlberg-Mertens  basic existence  result gives us an 
instant  corollary. 
COROLLARY.  Insofar  as  the  deletion  of  type-message  pairs  falls 
under either category permitted  by Fact 5, some one or more of 
the  equilibrium  outcomes  of  the  fixed  signaling  game  must 
pass the test that has been posed. 
2. Dominance 
We can now pose specific tests  that  follow the general scheme 
above. An obvious test,  and one that is well-known  to practitioners 
of signaling games, involves dominance. Pose the following criterion 
for eliminating  type-message  pairs: 
Elimination  of  type-message  pairs  by  dominance.  For  out  of 
equilibrium message m, type t may be eliminated  for this message if 
there is some other message m' with 
(2)  mnm u(t,m',r)  >  max  u(t mr). 
rCR  Mm')  r ER(m)  ' 
(We could get by with a weak inequality  here, but we use the strict 
inequality  to facilitate  comparison with later tests.) 
From this  criterion for the  elimination  of type-message  pairs, 
we can construct many tests.  We might allow for a single application 
of this  criterion, which corresponds  to one round of elimination  of 
strategies  dominated  for  A.  We  might  allow  for  the  deletion  of 
message-response  pairs as in IV.1, followed by one round of elimina- 
tion  of  type-message  pairs  using  this  criterion.  We  might  allow 
iterated  application  of the two, for as long as it is profitable.  (Such 
an iteration  must  terminate  eventually,  as there  are only  finitely 
many  message-response  and  type-message  pairs  to  delete.)  This 
corresponds to the iterated  application  of (sometimes  weak) domi- 
nance. And we could follow any of these with either Step 2 or 2A. It 
is evident  that  the  criterion above is "permitted"  under Fact  5, so 
that Proposition  1 and the corollary apply. 
Are any of these  tests  subsumed  by less stringent  refinements 
of  Nash  equilibrium?  The  answer  is  no for both  trembling-hand 
perfection  [Selten,  1975]  and  properness  [Myerson,  1978].  Con- 
sider,  for  example,  the  game  in  Figure  III.  (The  pictures  are  as 
before, except that in this case, as B is given no choice of response to 
the  message  m, we do not  bother  to put  in an information  set  for 
him.)  Consider the  equilibrium  outcome  in which both  types  of A 
send  the  message  m, ,and  B  responds  to  m' by  choosing  r1 with 
probability 0.5 or greater. To support this equilibrium, B's beliefs at 200  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMICS 
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the m' information  set must put weight 0.5 or more on A being type 
t2.  But  for  type  t2,  m  dominates  m'.  So,  by  any  of  the  tests 
constructed  from the dominance  criterion above, we can prune the 
type-message  pair (t2,m') from the game. In the game that is left, B 
must respond to m' with r2.  This causes the equilibrium  outcome to 
fail the test,  using either Step  2 or 2A, since this response  causes  t1 
to defect. 
The  game in normal form is given  in Table  I. (Note  that  the 
prior enters into the expected  payoff calculations.)  We leave to the 
reader the simple task of verifying that the equilibrium  in which A 
chooses m regardless of type and B responds to m' with r1 is indeed 
proper.  (Moreover,  it  is  easily  shown  to  be  perfect  in  the  agent 
normal form.) 
This  example  can be used  to make  another  point,  concerning 
properness for signaling games. (The material in this paragraph is a 
bit esoteric, and it may be skipped without loss of comprehension  of 
most  of the rest of the paper.)  Consider changing  the prior on A's 
type, from 0.9 that A is t1 to 0.9 that A is t2. Since, to support the m 
equilibrium  outcome,  it is necessary  that B "assess" high posterior 
TABLE  I 
GAME  OF FIGURE III  IN NORMAL  FORM 
Response 
ri  r2 
Message  if 
tl  t2 
m  m  0,0  0,0 
m  m  -0.1,  0.1  -0.1, 0 
m'  m  -0.9,0  0.9, 0.9 
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probability  that  m' comes from t2, this change would seem to make 
it harder to disqualify  the  equilibrium  outcome  under scrutiny.  In 
any event,  this  change  should  make it no easier. But  if the  reader 
constructs  the associated  normal form, he or she will find that this 
change renders the m,r1  equilibrium improper. Properness now does 
act to disqualify  this  equilibrium.  This  seems  rather counterintui- 
tive, but it is not hard to see why this is happening.  If we view this 
game  as a two-player  game  (A and B),  then  we must  make  some 
intertypal  comparisons of payoffs. That is, we have to aggregate the 
payoffs of type  t1 and type  t2 of A. The prior, in this  case, serves to 
scale these payoffs; when the prior is high that A is type t1, then it is 
a "worse" mistake for t1  to send m' than it is for t2 (if  is responding 
with  r1) simply  because  it  is a mistake  that  happens  with  higher 
probability.  We would see the same thing  if we rescaled the utility 
of one type  (but not the other) of A; if, say, we changed  t1's payoffs 
to 0 if m, -100  if m',r1,  and 100 if m',r2,  then the range of priors for 
which m,r1  is proper expands. Especially  if we regard these as games 
of incomplete  (as opposed to imperfect)  information, this intertypal 
comparison  of  utility  seems  nearly  as  suspect  as  would  be  an 
interpersonal  comparison. We shall try to avoid intertypal  compari- 
sons of utility  for the rest of the paper, which means,  among other 
things,  that we abandon properness.  The most expedient  means of 
being sure that we are not making intertypal  comparisons  of utility 
is  to  regard  signaling  games  not  as  two-player  but  rather  as 
T + 1-player games, where T stands here for the number of types of 
A; each  type  of  A  is  regarded  as  a separate  player.  We  shall  on 
occasion,  use  language  appropriate  to  this  interpretation  in what 
follows.  One further word on this: while the properness  of the  m,r1 
equilibrium depends  on the prior, there is another equilibrium with 
the m outcome, namely where B randomizes evenly between the two 
responses,  which is not proper for any prior. Moreover, the improp- 
erness  of this  equilibrium  is unaffected  by resealing  of one type's 
utility.  The  reader will be better  able to see why this  is happening 
when we move on in our development  to divinity. 
The  power of iterated  dominance  in signaling  games has long 
been  noted.  See,  for  example,  the  development  in  Milgrom  and 
Roberts  [1986]. 
3. Equilibrium  Dominance  and the Intuitive  Criterion 
Fix a particular equilibrium  outcome,  and use, as before, u*(t) 
to denote the expected  payoff at this outcome to type  t of A. 
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message pairs was domination:  the pair (t,m) is eliminated  if there 
is a message  m' available to t that  does better,  no matter what was 
the response of B to that message, than the best that t can obtain if 
he sends m. Consider weakening  this to read: the pair (t,m) may be 
eliminated  if 
(3)  u* (t) > max u(tmr). 
r 
Comparing  with  (2),  we  see  that  the  difference  is  that  the  value 
against  which  the  consequences  of  sending  m  are  tested  is  the 
expected  value that  t obtains  at the given equilibrium,  rather than 
the  worst  that  can  be  gotten  by  sending  some  other  message. 
Clearly,  this  new  criterion  will  allow  us  to  eliminate  more  type- 
message  pairs in the application  of the first sort of substep.  In the 
sequel,  it is called  equilibrium  domination,  or domination  by the 
equilibrium  value. 
Construct  from  equilibrium  domination  the  following  test. 
First,  throw  out  all  message-response  pairs  (m,r)  such  that 
r  t  BR(T(m),m).  Then  use equilibrium  domination  to dispose  of 
type-message  pairs.  Then  apply  Step  2A.  In  aggregate,  this  test 
amounts to the following. 
THE INTUITIVE  CRITERION.  For each out of equilibrium  message m, 
form the set S(m)  consisting  of all types  t such that 
r  (t)  'rBR  (T(m),m)  tmr) 
If for any one message m there is some type t' Q  T (necessarily 
not in S(m))  such that 
U  *(t') <  min  u Wt,  m',  r), 
then  the  equilibrium  outcome  is  said  to  fail  the  Intuitive 
Criterion. 
This is the criterion used in the beer-quiche  example.  (Since we 
begin  with  a  round  of  elimination  of  message-response  pairs,  it 
serves both for the original example  and the variation.)  It has been 
used in a number of applications:  by Grossman  [1981] directly; by 
Kreps and Wilson [1982b] and Milgrom and Roberts  [1982a] almost 
directly  (those analyses  involve a richer dynamic  structure than we 
have  here); Rubinstein's  [1985]  assumption  B-1  is closely  related 
(albeit again with a richer dynamic structure). 
Despite  the  name  we have  given  it, the  Intuitive  Criterion  is 
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tions of dominance.)  Equilibrium  dominance accords a crucial role 
to the particular  equilibrium  outcome  under  discussion,  yet, when it 
works,  it proceeds  to discredit that equilibrium  outcome.6  Consider 
in this regard the example of Section II, beer-quiche. We argued 
that, at the equilibrium  outcome in which both types have quiche 
for breakfast,  the wimp would never willingly defect to a breakfast 
of beer, because the best he could do with this breakfast  gave him a 
lower  utility than what he got at the equilibrium.  If player  B regards 
this as logical, then introspection would cause B to respond to beer 
without a duel, based on beliefs that this breakfast was a sure sign 
that A is surly. The surly A, capable of replicating this introspec- 
tion, then applies  forward  induction to conclude  that a breakfast  of 
beer is worthwhile. 
But now take this a step further. If B can, through introspec- 
tion, come to this conclusion,  and if B believes that A can come to it 
as well, then B will expect A, if surly, to have chosen beer. Hence 
quiche is a sure sign of a wimp, and should be met with a duel. And, 
therefore, having quiche will not net the wimpish A a utility of 3, 
but rather 1, which means that a breakfast  of beer cannot be taken 
as a sure sign that A is surly, which breaks  the chain of the previous 
argument  just where it started. 
We respond to this counterargument  from the following gen- 
eral perspective. An equilibrium is meant to be a candidate for a 
mode of self-enforcing  behavior  that is common knowledge among 
the players. (Most justifications for Nash equilibria come down to 
something like this. See, for example, Aumann [1987] or Kreps 
[forthcoming]).  In testing a particular  equilibrium (or equilibrium 
outcome), one holds to the hypothesis that the equilibrium (out- 
come) is common knowledge  among the players, and one looks for 
"contradictions."  Thus, to argue, in our example, that beer might 
conceivably be better for the wimp than is quiche, because quiche 
might engender a duel, is to accept the contention that the quiche 
outcome equilibrium is  not  a good candidate for self-enforcing 
behavior. 
A comparison with McLennan's [1985] justifiable  beliefs is 
appropriate  here. Note that McLennan's  concept derives from an 
inequality that is very similar  to (3). The major  difference,  roughly, 
is  that  on the  left-hand side he  puts the  minimum sequential 
equilibrium  outcome to the player, for any sequential equilibrium, 
whereas we use  the  payoff from the  equilibrium payoff under 
6.  The argument to follow was first given in our hearing by Joe Stiglitz. 204  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMICS 
consideration.  Thus,  we give a much greater role to the  particular 
equilibrium  payoff  under  consideration.  We hold  very  strictly,  in 
this,  to  the  notion  that  the  particular  equilibrium  is  common 
knowledge  among the players,  and we have in mind  a "story" that 
says  that  out-of-equilibrium  messages  should  be  construed  as 
conscious  defections  from  the  equilibrium.  If  one  thought  that 
out-of-equilibrium  messages  were (probably)  the manifestation  of 
some player or other being  unaware of the  equilibrium,  and if one 
further thought  that  this  "defecting"  player  (who is unaware that 
he  is  defecting)  believes  that  some  other  sequential  equilibrium 
prevails  in this  instance,  then  McLennan's  weaker criterion  is the 
more sensible.  We wish  to stress  here that  the  Intuitive  Criterion 
relies  heavily  on  the  common  knowledge  of  the  fixed  candidate 
equilibrium  outcome  and,  in  particular,  attaches  a  very  specific 
meaning  (a conscious  attempt  to break that  equilibrium)  to defec- 
tions from the supposed  equilibrium. 
Whatever  its intuitive  merits,  the  Intuitive  Criterion is based 
on  a  criterion  for  striking  type-message  pairs  that  fits  into  the 
general program we are following. 
PROPOSITION  2.  If message m is equilibrium  dominated  for type t at 
some  equilibrium  outcome,  then  it  is  never  a  weak  best 
response at any equilibrium  that gives the outcome. 
This  requires no proof; it is almost  a matter  of definition.  Accord- 
ingly,  we  can  post  a  test  (stronger  than  the  intuitive  criterion), 
which we call the equilibrium  domination  test: 
EQUILIBRIUM  DOMINATION  TEST.  Fixing  an  equilibrium  outcome, 
strike  type-message  pairs  using  equilibrium  domination  and 
message-response  pairs  using  the  "never  a  best  response" 
criterion,  iterating  between  the  two  for as long  as either  has 
effect.  (Finite  termination  is assured by the  usual  argument.) 
Then apply Step 2. 
COROLLARY.  For a generic class of signaling games, a stable equilib- 
rium outcome will pass the equilibrium  domination  test. Every 
signaling  game from this  generic class  (therefore)  has at least 
one equilibrium  outcome that will pass this test. 
4. Divinity 
Banks  and  Sobel  [forthcoming]  propose  tests  of  equilibrium 
outcomes  in signaling  games that  they  call divinity  and universal 
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other results here.) The reader  is urged  to read  their paper  to obtain 
a detailed analysis of these tests; but, for completeness, we briefly 
adopt their tests to the framework  we are using. 
Consider the  following two  criteria for disposing of  type- 
message pairs. Fix  the  equilibrium outcome. For a  given out- 
of-equilibrium message m and for each type  t, find all (mixed) 
responses 0  Q  MBR(T(m),m) by B that would cause t to defect 
from the equilibrium.  That is, for each t, form the set, 
Dt=  {  MBR(T(m),m): u*(t) <  u(tmr)0(r)}. 
r 
And define 
Do=  {  MBR(T(m),m):  u*(t)  =  E  u(tmr)0(  r)}. 
r 
CRITERION  Di.  If for some type t there exists a second type t' with 
Dt U D? C Dt, then (t,m) may be pruned from the game. 
CRITERION  D2. If for some type t, Dt U  Do C  U t  ,tDt, then (t,m) 
may be pruned from the game. 
The intuition that is meant to be conveyed by these criteria is 
that whenever type  t  either wishes to defect and send m or is 
indifferent, some other type t' strictly wishes to defect. Hence it 
should be accorded  (by B) more  likely that the defection came from 
some other t' than that it comes from t. In D1, we require  that there 
is a single type t' that always strictly wishes to defect whenever t 
does. In D2, we pose the weaker  requirement  that for any response 
that causes t to defect, there is some type (which may change with 
the particular  response) that wishes strictly to do so. Note well that 
D2 will permit, in general, more type-message pairs to be struck 
than will D1. 
By striking the pair (t,m), B is assumed to believe that it is 
"infinitely more likely" that m has come from this other t'. One 
might therefore seek a milder restriction on B's beliefs-for  t such 
that DA  U D? is nonempty, require  only that B's beliefs given m do 
not raise the probability  that A is t relative  to the probability  that A 
is some other t'. (That is, require  thatu(t;m)/,(t';m)  ?< r(m)AxW).) 
(When Dt U  D? is empty, strike (t,m) as before.) The intuition is 
that t should be no more likely to send m than is t'. 
Divinity is, roughly,  a test formed from iterated application of 
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does not correspond  to the  striking  of type-message  pair and thus 
does not fit into our general scheme,  but it does have considerable 
intuitive  appeal.  Universal  divinity,  on the other hand, fits into our 
general scheme: it corresponds (again in spirit, as a precise compari- 
son is a bit subtle)  to iterated  application  of the strong restrictions 
that arise from pruning type-message  pairs on the basis of D2. 
One  could  build  as  well  weakened  forms  of  divinity  and 
university  divinity,  based  on  DI  instead  of  D2.  We  shall  see  an 
important  difference between  the two in the next subsection. 
Note  that  both  divinity  and universal  divinity  subsume  equi- 
librium domination.  For if message  m is equilibrium  dominated  for 
a type t, then for this message, Dt and DO  are both empty. As long as 
there  is any type  that  would  gain  from defecting  to  m, we prune 
(t,m).  (If no type  can ever gain from sending  m, then  the  equilib- 
rium outcome  will not  fail the  equilibrium  dominance  test  or any 
other that we can think of on account of this message.) 
The  connection  with  stability  is  established  in  the  usual 
fashion. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Any type-message  pair disposed  of by either crite- 
rion Dl  or D2 given above is never a weak best response  at the 
given  equilibrium  outcome.  Hence  a stable  equilibrium  out- 
come will pass the Banks-Sobel  test of universal divinity,  and a 
universally  divine  equilibrium  outcome  exists,  for generic sig- 
naling games. 
The proof is simple.  Since  D2 strikes more type-message  pairs, we 
shall work with it. If m were a weak best response  for type t at some 
equilibrium  giving  this  outcome,  then,  at  that  equilibrium,  the 
response 4(. ;m) would have to lie in Do. By assumption,  this  k(. ;m) 
lies in Dt for some other type  t', which immediately  implies  that  it 
cannot  be an equilibrium  response  to the  out-of-equilibrium  mes- 
sage m; it would cause t' to defect. 
5. Never  a Weak Best Response 
The proof of Proposition  3 makes clear that we would not run 
afoul of stability  if we modified the criterion to read as follows: 
Fix the equilibrium outcome  and an out-of-equilibrium  message  m, 
and  define  Do and Dt as above.  Then  the  pair  (t,m)  may  be 
pruned if DC  U  ttDt 
In other  words, prune  (t,m)  precisely  when  there  is no sequential 
equilibrium  response  to  m  at  which  t  is  indifferent  between  the 
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response relative to  the  set  of sequential equilibria giving this 
outcome. 
Tests built up out of this criterion  will be stronger  than those 
built up out of the criteria of the previous section, as the game 
depicted in Figure  IV shows.7  We consider  the equilibrium  outcome 
in which both types send message m', and B responds to m with high 
weight on response r3. In this game, B's mixed best responses to m 
include all three pure strategies,  mixtures of r1  and r2,  and mixtures 
of r2  and r3. Simple algebra  shows that Dt, consists of mixtures of r1 
and r2 and mixtures of r2 and r3, where in each case r2  has weight 
more  than  1/2;  D?, the  frontier  of  this  set.  And  Dt, consists  of  all 
mixtures of r1 and r2, plus mixtures of r2 and r3 that put weight 
greater  than 2/3  on r2;  Do, consists solely of the mixture  2/3  on r2 and 1/3 
on r3.  By the criterion  of the previous  section, no pruning  is possible. 
But by the never a best weak response criterion,  we can prune type 
t2  for the message m. Doing so causes B to play the pure strategy r1, 
which is not an equilibrium  response in the original game (type t2 
would defect). 
With reference to footnote 5, note that in this example we 
prune type  t2. This restricts the beliefs of B, who then takes a 
response that causes the pruned player to defect from the original 
equilibrium.  If there is some implicit "speech"  to go with the "never 
a weak best response"  criterion,  similar  to the speech that goes with 
the Intuitive Criterion,  it would have to run something like: 
7. This example  is based on another,  similar  example,  from  Banks and Sobel. 208  QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
At this equilibrium  outcome,  you should  realize  that I am nott2,because....  Of 
course, you should avoid drawing  the accompanying  inference,  which is that 
only if I am t2  would  I wish to be making  this speech. 
We do not wish to make too much of these "speeches." But we 
cannot suggest an intuitive inferential  process for B (of the type we 
have been considering) that  accompanies a defection from this 
equilibrium  outcome and that leads B to conclude that the defec- 
tion cannot be from the only type that would benefit from the 
defection if B makes  that inference.  On intuitive grounds,  one might 
wish  to  insist  that  a  defection that  breaks an  equilibrium is 
accompanied  by a process of inference  that leads B to put weight on 
those types that would break the equilibrium. (This philosophy 
finds favor in the related work of Farrell [1985] and Grossman  and 
Perry [1986b].) Certainly, such a restriction is obeyed by domi- 
nance and by equilibrium dominance. In other words, we could 
rewrite  Step 2 of our tests to read:  with beliefs restricted in Step 1, 
the equilibrium  should founder or not based on a defection from a 
type that has not been pruned for the out-of-equilibrium  message 
under consideration. And the tests based on criteria up through 
equilibrium  dominance  would not be affected. But the never a weak 
best response criterion would be changed. We do not  find this 
intuitive. 
What of universal divinity in this regard? If one insisted on 
criterion DI  in  order to  strike a  type-message pair, then  the 
resulting  test would be safe; an equilibrium  outcome that failed the 
test would fail because of (at least) one uneliminated type. But if 
criterion  D2 is used, the resulting  test is not safe. One can construct 
examples in which, at a given stage, one type is eliminated by virtue 
of several  others, one of which is simultaneously  eliminated because 
the first type is not yet eliminated. That is, each helps to eliminate 
the other. We are, in consequence,  happier  with tests built up out of 
DI than with those built up out of D2.8 
V.  THE  SPENCE SIGNALING  MODEL 
As an example of the various tests posed above, we consider a 
simple case of the Spence [1974] signaling model. In so doing, we 
shall be a bit casual, leaving it to the reader  to fill in the gaps.9 
We imaging  that a given worker  is one of T types, indexed 1, 2, 
8.  We are grateful  to Gyu Ho Wang for this  observation,  and for correcting an 
earlier version of this paper on this point. 
9.  The  reader, wishing  to  see  our basic  argument  made  both  exact  and more 
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...  ,  T. (The usual story in the Spence model is that there are many 
workers,  divided by types. We could use this formulation equally 
easily.) The prior  probability  that the worker  is of type n is rn.  The 
worker  moves first, choosing an education  level e from the set [0,oo). 
Then two risk-neutral  firms, having observed the education choice 
but not the type of the worker,  bid for the services of the worker. 
The bidding is in the style of Bertrand, with each naming a wage 
w G  [O,oo)  that it is willing to pay the worker;  the worker  chooses 
whichever  firm bids the most; if the firms offer the same wage, the 
worker  chooses by means of a coin flip. The worker  is worth ne to 
the firm if n is the worker's  type and e is the level of education he 
obtained. If the worker  is of type n, is paid w, and obtains education 
level e, then the worker's  utility is w -  kne2,  for strictly positive 
constants  kn that  satisfy  k1 >  >  .  .  .  >  kT.  (This  particular 
parametric  family of indifference  curves is irrelevant  to the analy- 
sis-any  family with the property that the marginal disutility of 
education strictly decreases  with type will do.) 
We should note immediately that while we have assumed only 
a finite number of types of players, we are allowing  infinitely many 
actions for each type, and infinitely many responses by the firms. 
Thus, stability cannot properly  be applied to this analysis;  indeed, 
the definition  of a sequential equilibrium  must be specially adapted 
to this context. We shall therefore continue in the spirit of sequen- 
tial equilibrium and of the restrictions on beliefs posed formally 
above. 
A sequential equilibrium is defined as follows: type n selects 
education levels according  to some probability distribution p(.;n); 
we shall restrict attention to equilibria  in which these distributions 
are discrete and have finite support, so that p(e;n) will denote the 
probability with which type n  selects education level e.10  Firms 
respond to education level e according to commonly held beliefs 
tu(. I  e)  as to the type of worker that  has selected  e;  i  (. ;e) gives the 
wage offered  by firm i if e is selected. In equilibrium: 
(i) Education levels must be chosen by the worker in a way that 
maximizes  his expected utility, taking as given the offers of the two 
firms. 
(ii) At each education level e, firms must bid optimally, given the 
bidding function of the other firm, and holding to beliefs about the 
quality of the worker  given by A. 
(iii) At every education level e that is selected by the worker  with 
10.  The interested  reader can verify that if any Borel distributions  are allowed, 
all equilibria will have the character of finite support. 210  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMICS 
positive probability, the firms' beliefs should be generated in the 
usual fashion by Bayes' rule. 
Note that in (ii) we require optimality of the firms' bids at every 
education level, given their beliefs. So it is (iii) that ties the firms' 
equilibrium  strategies to the worker's. 
Bertrand competition among the firms ensures that in any 
equilibrium,  they bid precisely the expected value (to them) of the 
worker.  That is,  *(.  ;e) is a point mass at the value 2T  1 g(n I  e)ne. We 
abbreviate  this sum by W(e;g) in what follows. 
The equilibrium is said to be a screening equilibrium if the 
supports of the various p(. ;n) do not intersect. A particular  candi- 
date for a screening equilibrium  outcome, which we call the Riley 
outcome (after Riley [1979]), is constructed as follows. The least 
able  type  n  =  1  chooses the  (unique) education level  e  that 
maximizes  e -  kle2. That is, type 1 picks the best education  level for 
himself, given that the wage commanded  will be the wage appropri- 
ate for him. Call this et.  Then type 2 chooses the (unique) level of 
education that maximizes 2e -  k2e2,  subject to the constraint that 
2e -  kle2 ?  e*  -  k1e*. In words, type 2 chooses  the best  education 
level for himself, assuming that he will be paid at a wage appropri- 
ate to his type, subject to the constraint that 1 would not strictly 
prefer  to choose this education level (and wage) over e*. And so on: 
type n chooses the best level given that assuming that he will be 
paid appropriate  to his type, subject to the constraint  that no lower 
index  type  would strictly prefer to  pretend to  be  type  n,  in 
preference  to staying at the (previously  determined)  education  level 
(and appropriate  wage) for the lower type. Denote the education 
levels so derived by e*. 
We leave to the reader the task of showing that this  does 
indeed give a screening equilibrium  outcome. (One must fill in the 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs and wage offers, and there are many 
choices for this.) We wish instead to demonstrate that the Riley 
outcome is the only equilibrium  outcome that survives the sorts of 
tests we have posed previously.  More  precisely,  if there are only two 
types of worker,  then the Riley outcome is the only outcome that 
survives  the Intuitive Criterion.  With more than two types, it is the 
only equilibrium  outcome to survive Banks-Sobel universal divin- 
ity,  as  defined in  subsection IV.4.  (With  two  or  more types, 
dominance arguments as  in  subsection IV.2 can be  applied to 
restrict somewhat the equilibrium outcomes; and with more than 
two types,  equilibrium dominance can provide somewhat more 
restrictions.  We do not chase down all these partial implications,  in 
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Case A. Two Types 
When there are only two types of worker,  the Intuitive Crite- 
rion suffices to make the argument. Consider first the possibility 
that the two types pool; they each pick some education level ep with 
positive probability. Refer to Figure V. Since each picks ep with 
positive probability, gu(2;ep)  < 1, and W(ep,,u)  must be less than 2ep. 
In Figure V we draw the  indifference curves of  the  two types 
through the equilibrium education and wage pair (epW(ep)). By 
assumption, the indifference curve of type 2 is less steeply sloped 
than that of type 1, so points such as those shaded along  the line w = 
2e exist. Since wages can never exceed twice education level in any 
sequential equilibrium,  type 1 would be strictly worse off picking 
education level e* (as shown) than he is at the equilibrium.  Hence 
by the Intuitive Criterion,  we must be able to support the equilib- 
rium with beliefs by the firm that e* is chosen by a worker  of type 2 
with probability  one. But this would lead to a wage W(e*;,u) = 2e*, 
which causes type 2 to defect from the equilibrium. 
Hence only screening equilibrium can survive the  Intuitive 
Criteria.  Since in any sequential equilibrium  wages at level e must 
be at least e, it is easy to see that, in any screening  equilibrium,  type 
1 will select his Riley level e*. And then the Intuitive Criterion  again 
tells us that the equilibrium  must be supportable  by beliefs which 
put weight one on type 2 for any education level e such that 
(4)  2e -  kie2  <  e*  -  ki(e*)2; 
type  1  is  certain to  do worse (given a  sequential equilibrium 
wage -  w 
Aw2e 
type 1 indifference curve  type  2 indifference 
w*(ep;/L) 
w-? 
ep  e*  e-education  level 
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response from the firms) at such levels e than at his equilibrium 
value. As in Figure  VI, let e' be the level of e where  we get equality in 
(4). It will not be a screening equilibrium for type 2 to select an 
education  level less than eo,  and the argument  just given tells us that 
we cannot have a screening equilibrium  that survives the Intuitive 
Criterion  if we force 2 to some education level above eo  other than 
his "constrained  first best" from that set. Hence the Riley outcome 
is the only outcome that can survive. 
Case B. More Than  Two Types"1 
The Intuitive Criterion  does not suffice to get us to the Riley 
outcome, if there are more than two types. Consider  Figure VII, for 
three types. Here we have drawn  an equilibrium  outcome at which 
types l and 2 pool at education level ep, and type 3 is screened at 
education  level e3.  To break  the pool, we would  want (in the spirit of 
the previous arguments) to have type 2 offer an education level so 
high that type 1 would never do so in preference  to the equilibrium. 
But  since the  firms could conceivably respond as  if  this  out- 
of-equilibrium  signal came from type 3, the education level needed 
to do this is at least eo  (as shown). If type 2 picks a level a bit higher 
than this, he can be sure to get a wage  of 2e or more.  But this will not 
guarantee that he gets more from the defection than he gets from 
the equilibrium.  Indeed, this equilibrium  does survive  the Intuitive 
Criterion  (and equilibrium  dominance). 
11.  We are especially  grateful to John Roberts, who pointed  out an error in our 
earlier analysis of this case, and who helped  us to find the correct argument. SIGNALING  GAMES  AND STABLE  EQUILIBRIA  213 
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But it falls when the test constructed out of criterion DI  is 
applied. Indeed, all pooling equilibria  fail this test. Suppose in some 
equilibrium that  we  had  pooling of  two  types  or more at  an 
education level e. Let n index the highest type in the pool. Then at 
any education  level above e, any response (wage)  that a lower index 
type would prefer to the equilibrium,  the higher index type would 
strictly prefer. Hence the equilibrium outcome would have to be 
supportable  by beliefs in which the highest index type in any pool 
can, by choosing a slightly higher education level than the pooling 
level, be assured of a wage appropriate to (at least) his type. No 
pooling equilibrium  can survive  this. (The test built out of criterion 
Dl is powerful  stuff indeed!) 
Hence only screening equilibria can survive this  test.  And 
among those, only the Riley outcome will do so. We leave to the 
reader  the task of showing  that the only way that the Riley outcome 
can be  missed in  a  screening equilibrium is  if,  for some  two 
successive types n and n  +  1, the picture is as in Figure VIII. But 
then for education levels above the point marked e', the "better 
than equilibrium"  set for n (and lower types) is strictly included in 
the same set for type n +  1. The DI test requires  that the outcome 
be supported  by beliefs that put no weight on types n or less, which 
is manifestly impossible. 
Does the Riley outcome  survive  the DI (and even, the D2) test? 
We leave it to the reader  to show that the answer  is yes. 214  QUARTERLY JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
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Finally, we observe that the Intuitive  Criterion would suffice if 
we modified  the  game form.12 We have  supposed  that  the  worker 
obtains  an education  level,  and then  the  firms bid for his services. 
Suppose that we modified things slightly, so that the worker obtains 
education,  and then  the  worker proposes  the wage that  he wishes; 
the firms then  (simultaneously  and independently)  signify whether 
they are willing to hire the worker at that wage. In this game, there 
are sequential  equilibria in which the worker, in equilibrium,  is paid 
less than his expected  value to the firm. (The worker cannot ask for 
more  because  this  would  change  beliefs.)  But  when  the  Intuitive 
Criterion  is  applied  to  this  game,  one  can  show  that  the  unique 
equilibrium  outcome  that survives  is the Riley  outcome,  no matter 
how many  types  there  are (as long  as the  number  is finite).  This 
observation is especially  pertinent  when one thinks  of applying this 
sort of criterion to alternating  move bargaining games, as there the 
party  who is "on the  move"  is allowed  to  propose  an entire  deal, 
which the other party must accept or reject. This gives the intuitive 
criterion  (and similarly  based  tests)  more bite  in those  games; cf. 
Admati and Perry [forthcoming]. 
VI.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS-THE  FULL IMPLICATIONS 
OF STABILITY 
The arguments just given are not meant to justify restriction to 
the Riley outcome  in the Spence  signaling model. In the first place, 
12. We thank Anat Admati  for this observation. SIGNALING  GAMES  AND STABLE  EQUILIBRIA  215 
the specific game form used is crucial."3  But more importantly to 
this paper is that we do not mean to advocate all the tests we have 
described. The  demonstration above shows the  tests  we  have 
devised are  very powerful  in applications;  perhaps  too powerful.  We 
have posed these tests in a general framework  in order  to provide a 
somewhat  general  typology of such tests, and to see them at work  in 
examples. The reader must be the judge of which, if any, of them 
provide reasonable tests  of  equilibrium outcomes in  particular 
manifestations in signaling  games. 
We also have sought to  relate these tests  to  stability as it 
applies to signaling  games. Since stability entails them all, if any of 
them is thought to be unintuitive, then the implications  of stability 
cannot be accepted without some further thought. We ourselves 
find the D1 test very strong in the context of the Spence model, and 
we find "never a weak best response," at least as it applies to the 
example in subsection IV.5, to be downright unintuitive. But the 
reader should be warned that stability does not end with "never a 
weak best response."  A general characterization  of stability for the 
outcomes of (a generic class of) signaling  games runs as follows. 
Fix a signaling  game and some equilibrium  outcome. For each 
unsent message m, let T.m denote the set of all pairs (A,S), where  ,  is 
a probability distribution on T(m) and S is a subset of T(m) such 
that, at some sequential equilibrium with the given outcome, B's 
response  (. ;m) to m satisfies 
(i)  ( *  ;m) E  MBR (Am), and 
(ii) u*(t)  = 1ru(t,m,r)0(r;m)  for all t Q S. 
That is, at beliefs gt,  B has an equilibrium  response that makes m a 
weak best response for all the types in S simultaneously. 
PROPOSITION  4. For a generic class of signaling games, an equilib- 
rium outcome is stable if and only if: for every unsent message 
m and probability distribution 0 over T(m), there is  some 
(gS)  E  Tm such that ,  is in the convex hull of 0 and the space 
of all probability  distributions on S. 
We do not attempt to prove  this proposition  here. It is far from 
trivial, and the reader should be warned that the generic class for 
13.  Martin  Hellwig  [1985]  has  shown  that,  with  a  different  game  form, 
C.  Wilson's  reactive  equilibrium  outcome  is  the  only  outcome  to  satisfy  the 
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which it is true is smaller  than the class of signaling  games that have 
only a finite number  of equilibrium  outcomes.14 
To see this proposition in action (and to see the strength of 
stability), consider a signaling game with three types, tl,t2,t3,  two 
messages, m' and m, and three responses to m, rl,r2,r3. We shall 
examine  the outcome  in which  all three types send m'  with probabil- 
ity  one, assuming that B  has a unique best response which he 
chooses. The out-of-equilibrium  data of the game are depicted in 
Figures IXa and IXb. 
Figure  IXa depicts the best responses  of B to m as  unction of 
his "posterior"  assessment on the type of A. So, for 'Example,  if B is 
certain  that the type is t1, he chooses response rl. If B is certain that 
the type is  t3,  he chooses r2. If he has an assessment that puts 
probability  1/2  on each of t2 and t3,  he chooses r3.  Note the point w;  at 
these beliefs, B is indifferent between all three responses, and any 
mixed strategy is a best response. 
Figure IXb depicts, as a function of B's response to m, which 
types  (if  any)  of A  would prefer m to  m' (thus  breaking the 
equilibrium outcome we  are examining). So,  for  each  n,  if  B 
responds  to m with more than weight 2/3 on rn, type Tn  would prefer 
m to m'.  At precisely  weight 2/3  on rn, type tn is indifferent. 
These data are consistent with the following assignment of 
payoffs: let all equilibrium payoffs if m' is sent be 0. In case the 
message is m, payoffs to A and B, depending on the type of A and 
the response by B, are given in Table II, with A's payoff first. 
The payoffs are in "general position" as concerns the argu- 
ments we shall make-the  same arguments could be made for all 
payoffs in some open neighborhood  of the payoffs that give these 
data. 
Note that it is indeed an equilibrium  outcome for each type to 
send m'. This can be seen in Figure IXb, where we find a region 
(shaded) of responses by B at which no type strictly prefers  to send 
m. Moreover,  the outcome is sequential, since beliefs w justify any 
response by B. And all the tests  posed above are passed: every 
response to m is justified by some beliefs, and sending m is a weak 
best response  for each type, at some equilibrium. 
Yet the equilibrium  outcome is not stable. Consider  a pertur- 
bation of the game in which type t, sends m by "trembling"  much 
more  than do types t2  and t3. Unless something  is done to change  the 
beliefs of B, B will respond  with rl, which  will break  the equilibrium. 
14.  Banks  and  Sobel  [forthcoming],  who arrived at this  proposition  indepen- 
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TABLE  II 
PAYOFFS  TO A AND B IF MESSAGE m  IS SENT 
Type of A 
tl  t2  t3 
Response  of B 
ri  1,3  -2,3  -2,0 
r2  -2,0  1,0  -2,3 
r3  -2,0  -2,2  1,2 
Now we can, by  looking at  equilibria where r2 is  played with 
probability  2/3,  have t2  indifferent  between m and m',  and so we could 
at such an equilibrium increase the posterior belief that m comes 
from t2. But to get B to play r2  with any probability at all, B must 
have posterior  beliefs that put substantial weight (at least 1/2)  on m 
coming from t3. (Refer to Figure IXa and the region in which r2  is a 
best response.) Alternatively, we can look at equilibria where r3 is 
played with probability  2/3,  and thus make t3  indifferent.  But to have 
B respond with positive probability  on r3, the posterior  weight on t2 
must be at least 1/4.  And this would require a response that puts 
weight at least 2/3  on r2.  Because  there is no equilibrium  (at the given 
outcome) at which  both  t2 and  t3 are simultaneously  indifferent 
between  m and m', it is impossible  to increase  simultaneously  B's 
posterior  assessment  that  m comes  from  each.  And  to  raise  the 
probability  of either, we need B to hold beliefs that put substantial 
weight on the other. The equilibrium  outcome is not stable. 
In contrast,  if the data were consistent with Figure IXc instead 
of IXb, there would be an equilibrium  response (namely, the point 
marked  4i* in IXc) at which both t2  and t3  are indifferent  between m 
and m', which would allow us to move from trembles that put most 
of the weight on t1 to the point a,  which in turn supports the 
response 0*. (Payoffs for A that are consistent with IXc are easy to 
compute.) 
In terms of the proposition let 0 = (1,0,0) (where the vector 
refers  to the probability  of the types in order).  With the data of IXb, 
the candidates for sets S in TM are {t1},  {t2j, and {t31.  Hence we can 
only "pull" 0 along the two faces of the simplex. Pulling in the 
direction of t2 is clearly  useless, as this will not change B's response 
at all. It is possible, moving from 0 in the direction of t3, to reach 
beliefs that are equilibrium  beliefs-namely  those that are labeled 
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includes none that make t3  indifferent. If, on the other hand, the 
data were as in IXc, then the pair (w,{t2,t3}) is in *m. Thus, with the 
equilibrium  response 4*, we can "stabilize"  any initial perturbation 
0 such that w is in the convex hull of 0 and the face of types t2 and t3. 
That is, all perturbations  0 in the shaded region of Figure IXd are 
stabilized by w and 0*, including (1,0,0)-the  reader  can verify that 
every other initial perturbation can be stabilized at some other 
equilibrium  with the m' outcome. 
The characterization  given in Proposition 4 shows that stabil- 
ity (for generic  signaling  games) entails two considerations  that our 
earlier  criteria  did not. First, one must consider  for which subsets of 
types it is possible to find an equilibrium  at which all types in the 
subset  are indifferent between the  equilibrium and  some out- 
of-equilibrium  message. Second (and less apparent  from our exam- 
ple) is that perturbations that can be stabilized at a particular 
equilibrium  depend on "direction"-one  projects from the face of 
indifferent  types,  past  beliefs  that  support  the  equilibrium 
response, to find what perturbations are stabilized at the given 
equilibrium. (If this second consideration is not clear, it should 
provide the reader  with sufficient  motivation to consult Banks and 
Sobel [forthcoming],  whose example of an unstable outcome that 
survives "never a  weak best  response" trades  on  this  second 
consideration.) 
We do not mean to say that the m' equilibrium  outcome in the 
examples  of Figure  IX is not breakable  by intuitive agreements.  For 
example, the criterion proposed by Grossman and Perry [1986b] 
does break  this equilibrium.15  But their criterion  works  equally well 
if the data are given by IXa and IXc as if they are given by IXa and 
IXb, so stability makes a distinction here that we cannot motivate 
intuitively.16  We conclude that, if there is an intuitive story to go 
with the full strength of stability, it is beyond our powers  to offer it 
here. 
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